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Abstract  
Even as the BBA model has not made a complete exit from Islamic home financing, the musharkah mutanaqisa 
partnership (MMP) model is fast gaining popularity with the jurists and the bankers alike as a truly interest free 
alternative. This paper reproduces our earlier evidence that the MMP model is no different from the conventional 
home financing involving interest. In this context it refers to actual cases from some countries, especially the US, 
where MMP is gaining ground. We shall reiterate that our Diminishing Balance Model (DBM) in several ways over 
the MMP.. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is gratifying to note that Muslim countries have of late been turning to the importance shelter 
has among the basic human needs an Islamic order is obliged to meet for promoting communal 
peace and cohesion; they are attempting to mitigate the shortfalls in housing. Islamic banks too 
have launched a number of schemes for home financing. Among them they initially started with 
the structures based on BBA but are recently shifting fast to Musharkah Mutanaqisah 
Partnership (MMP) models as replacement due to their apparent immunity from interest.  
          However, I have recently demonstrated that the conventional finance and the MMP are at 
par with regard to interest and presented a Diminishing Balance model or the DBM as an 
alternative (Hasan; 2011). The model is entirely free from juridical suspicions and has some 
additional merits as well. The model with some improvements is reproduced below for making 
this paper self-contained.   
         My earlier paper referred to above uses a simple illustration with identical details for model 
comparisons. Put briefly, the illustration assumed that a customer wants to purchase from a seller 
a house, RM 100,000 being its cash down price. He pays RM 20,000 as earnest money to the 
seller with a promise to clear the remaining RM80000 within three months. In search of the 
cheapest terms available for raising this amount (faith not affecting his choice), the customer first 
approaches a conventional bank with a plan to clear the liability in 10 years, spread over 20 six-
monthly installments. The conventional bank offers to meet his requirements at 8% interest a 
year plus a capital redemption factor of 6.71%; the overall annual rate thus being 14.71%, the 
six-monthly rate being 7.355%. Each installment at that rate would equal (80,000 x 0. 07355) or 
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RM 5884. Under the terms the bank offers, the interest payments would stop if at any time 
before the expiry of the contract, the client clears the outstanding amount in full. The house is to 
be registered in the name of the customer who would simultaneously mortgage it with the bank 
as security. The customer now approaches an Islamic bank for cost comparison. 
          The Islamic bank too agrees to the payment schedule of the customer but shuns interest. It 
offers him a Mishawka mutanaqisah participatory plan, the MMP.  The bank and the customer 
start with a co-ownership of the house to be registered in the name of the customer. They also 
agree to an annual 8% rental value for the house to be shared in the customer-bank ownership 
ratio at points in time. Under the plan, the customer would surrender his rent share to the bank 
for buying away the bank‟s ownership units in installments. The installments are so designed that 
the debt is cleared on time giving the bank the stipulated return as well. Thus, the bank would not 
only receive a share in rent proportionate to its ownership in the house at any point in time but 
also the part of rental accruing to the customer. Consequently, with each installment payment the 
bank‟s share in the house ownership will decrease by the amount of the customer-rental-share 
surrendered to the bank. That would progressively increase the rental share of the customer and 
help him reduce the debt at an increasing rate so that it is fully cleared on the due date.   
          However, as the customer‟s surrender of his part of the rental to the bank will not be 
enough to recover the amount in full, a redemption factor of 6.71% would be added to the 8% 
rental giving an overall six-monthly charge of 14.71 / 2 = 7. 355%, that is the rent plus 
redemption rate is halved for a six-monthly payments. This would fix the installment at 80000 x 
0.07355 = RM 5884: the same as in the case of the conventional bank. Since the entire rental 
goes to the bank the return (profit) component in the installment would be 5884 – 4000 = RM 
1884; It can be viewed as the price of one unit of bank‟s ownership the customer is obliged to 
buy each six months the remaining RM 4000 (i.e. 80000/20) in the installment being the capital 
repayment component. Table A2 in the Appendix explains the working of the MMP model.   
       Let us now explain the Diminishing Balance Model (DBM) and show its working using 
our earlier illustration. The bank proposes to the client as follows. You have already paid RM 
20000 to the seller as earnest money. The remaining RM 80000 the bank shall pay for acquiring 
the co-ownership in the house. For getting back the amount in six-monthly installments over a 
period of ten year, we shall put a yearly mark-up of 8% for our share in the cost of the house. 
However, the mark-up amount will be reduced proportionate to the return of our money. That 
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would help reduce your liability to the bank. The registration of the house in the court will be in 
your name but you will have to sign simultaneously a mortgage deed pledging the property with 
the bank as security until installments as per Table 1 have all been cleared in full. The Table 
provides the calculation for your six-monthly installments.   
                                             Table 1: Working of the Diminishing Balance Model                                                                                  
 
Installments 
Return of 
capital 
Diminishing 
balance 
Mark-up 
on C     
Installment 
Payments 
A B C D E = B + D 
 
0 0 80000   
1 4000 76000 3200 7200 
2 4000 72000 3040 7040 
3 4000 68000 2880 6880 
4 4000 64000 2720 6720 
5 4000 60000 2560 6560 
6 4000 56000 2400 6400 
7 4000 52000 2240 6240 
8 4000 48000 2080 6080 
9 4000 44000 1920 5920 
10 4000 40000 1760 5760 
11 4000 36000 1600 5600 
12 4000 32000 1440 5440 
13 4000 28000 1280 5280 
14 4000 24000 1120 5120 
15 4000 20000 960 4960 
16 4000 16000 800 4800 
17 4000 12000 640 4640 
18 4000 8000 480 4480 
19 4000 4000 320 4320 
20 4000 0 160 4160 
Total 80,000  33,600 11,3600 
 
         . The return on capital part is calculated at an agreed annual mark-up of 8% per annum 
operating on the diminishing balance as return to the bank. Thus, the installment would have a 
fixed component of capital return amounting RM 4000 = [80000 / 20]. The return on capital will 
be calculated on the capital remaining outstanding at the beginning of each six month at .08 / 2 = 
0.04 or 4%. Note that three separate contracts are involved in completing the sale-payment 
process under the DBM 
1. First is a contract of sale for joint ownership of the house involving three parties: the 
bank, the customer and the seller. The customer agrees to treat the earnest money as 
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paid for both the partners. The seller sells the property to the co-ownership of the 
bank and the customer after the former pays the balance of RM 80,000 to him to 
acquire an 80% share in the house.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Second is the contract between the customer and the bank, the latter selling his share 
in the property to him with an agreed mark-up spread at 8% a year on the outstanding 
amount.  
3. Third is the contract whereby the customer mortgages the house with the bank until 
the payments are all cleared in accordance with the terms of the mortgage.  
    The three contracts are to be executed simultaneously. The house is to be registered in the 
name of the customer. Let us now compare the three models placing side by side in Table 2 
the amounts the customer would have to pay as return to the bank in each case additional to 
the capital component in the installments.                                          
          The de facto annual rate of return on capital equals 4.73% [37846 / 80000] in both the 
conventional and the MMP structures. However, in Diminishing Balance Model or the DBM of 
our construct this rate reduces to 4.20% [33600 / 80000] the customer thus having 0.53% a year 
as comparative advantage. While the installments in the first two cases are fixed the same vary in 
the DBM. Table 3 puts the results together. The Appendix at the end provides Tables from which 
the relevant columns for the remaining models – conventional and the MMP – have been 
obtained. 
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         Figure 1: Diminishing Balance Model in operation: Three independent contracts 
           (1) 
(2) (3) 
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                                                     Table 2: Returns under each Model 
 
Installment  
number 
 
Conventional 
Interest 
 
MMP 
Rental 
 
DBM 
Mark-up 
 
Difference 
MMP – DBM 
1 3200 3200 3200 0 
2 3093 3093 3040 53 
3 2981 2981 2880 101 
4 2865 2865 2720 145 
5 2744 2744 2560 184 
6 2619 2619 2400 219 
7 2488 2488 2240 248 
8 2352 2352 2080 272 
9 2211 2211 1920 291 
10 2064 2065 1760 305 
11 1911 1912 1600 312 
12 1752 1752 1440 312 
13 1587 1588 1280 308 
14 1416 1415 1120 295 
15 1236 1236 960 276 
16 1050 1051 800 251 
17 857 856 640 216 
18 656 656 480 176 
19 447 447 320 127 
20 229 230 160 70 
Sub-total 37757 37757 33,600 4157 
Residual* 89 89 00 89 
Total 37846 37846 33,600 4246 
                             * The discrepancy of RM 89 arise because of approximations made in the calculation of the values 
                                              Table 3: Comparison of competitive house financing models 
 S. 
No 
Model Description 
finance 
provided 
Nature of 
installment 
Residual                
RM 
Profit of  
financier 
1. Conventional (Interest based) 80% Uniform 89 4.73% 
2. Musharakah mutanaqisa partnership (MMP) 80% Uniform 89 4.73% 
3. Diminishing Balance Model (DBM) 80% Non-uniform 0 4.20% 
 
           Today the MMP model for home financing is being used in many Muslim and non-
Muslim countries across the globe. It is operating under different names like „the declining 
balance program‟ of Zayan Finance, „the declining balance co-ownership program‟ of Guidance: 
residential or „the diminishing musharkah financing‟ of the Meezan. These banks have indulged 
in heavy advertising of their home financing structures. They claim them to be interest-free and 
quote world renowned Islamic jurists on their advisory boards in support to attract business.  
        We take as an illustration the celebrated American Finance House; its Islamic arm the 
LARIBA. Its “Lease to Purchase model” or LTP is typical of the MMP deployment in home 
financing. To explain the LTP application process AFH takes the cost of home as $150,000. The 
client pays $30,000 as down payment while the remaining $120,000 is provided by the LARIBA.  
The property is purchased jointly by the parties. The deferred payment is to be cleared over 15 
years in 180 monthly installments. The rent of the house is agreed to be $1000 per month. Table 
4 presents part of the amortization particulars as the AFH depicts in Table 1 of their document. 
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LARIBA claim their model being “free of interest” even as they explicitly admit that the 
transaction involves an implicit interest rate (p.3)
1
. What this rate is they do not indicate in the 
document. However, it is not difficult to find its magnitude from the data they provide in their 
Table 1 reproduced below as Table 4.  
                                            Table 4:  Showing an excerpt of amortization scheme 
Month 
Return on 
capital 
Return of 
capital 
Payments Balance 
Beginning --- --- --- $120,000 
1 $800 $347 $1147 $119653 
2 $789 $349 $1147 $119304 
--- --- --- --- --- 
180 $7 $1140 $1147 $0 
 
      The rental being $1000 a month, the annual return on $150,000 will be 8% (interestingly, the 
same as in our example). Now, if we assume the capital redemption factor added to this rental as 
B, we have: 
                     (0.08 + B) 120,000 = 1147 X 12             ($1147 is the monthly installment)… …. (1) 
                    This yields   9600 + 120,000B = 13764………………………………………… ... (2) 
                    Therefore, B = [13764 – 9600] / 120,000 = 0.0347 or 3.47 %....................................(3) 
 
          Thus, 3.47% is what the AFH document refers to as the imputed or implied interest we 
noted above. It is easy to verify the result. Putting B = .0347 in equation (1) we get the monthly 
installment = $1147, the same as in Table 3. Thus, there is riba in the home financing program of 
LARIBA. Still, the AFH claims and extensively publishes the world over that their model is at 
once Shari‟ah compliant! They nicely rap up interest in a rather foxy language as to how the 
return on capital is determined. Conventional banks straight away tell the customer that the 
quoted interest rate is not sufficient to fix the installment amount that would redeem his liability  
to the bank on the stipulated date  the relevant PVunless we add an appropriate redemption 
factor
2
. But the LARIBA document states that the total monthly charge containing return of 
                                                          
1
 This disclosure had to be made in compliance with the requirements of the financial law in the US. 
2
 In fact conventional banks add an appropriate redemption factor to the interest rate to ensure that the discounted 
income stream that installment payments generate equals to the present value (PV) of the loan. The jurists have to 
clarify the reason of allowing it in the MMP contracts as it imparts an interest element to the agreed upon rental rate 
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capital plus the return on it is a fixed amount its level depending on the payment plan data – the 
agreed rental, number of installments and the initial contribution of the parties to acquire joint 
ownership of the house. The implicit addition of a interest factor is not mentioned. This all is 
happening even as AFH has the cream of world jurists at their advisory let by Sheikh Taqi 
Usmani who append their signatures to the document. Possibly the learned Jurists could not look 
into the mathematics of the model. The addition of what is called the redemption factor to the 
interest/rental rates in the models has the advantage of keeping the installment uniform over the 
contract period which may have some psychological value for the customer. But let the bank 
explain to him that installment payment in the DBM will be known to him from the schedule 
attached to the contract and see if he will still like to go for the costlier MMP which in addition 
has an implicit interest element.
3
  
         Yavar in his comment on DBM posted on the INCEIF Blog sought an interesting and 
important clarification. He asked whether bank in its negotiations with the customer on the issue 
of rental would go for a relatively higher rate or seek a lower one. To provide an answer, we 
constructed a case using two more rental rates 10% and 6% placed on either side of the initial 8% 
in my model. We also made a simplifying assumption that the cuestomer himself lives in the 
house. The rental negotiation is just for accounting purposes; no money flows are involved. 
Table 5 below helps draw the conclusion. Row D of the Table shows that higher is the rental 
larger is the proportion of the total rent accruing to the bank. This means that the bank would  
                                      TABLE 5: VARYING RENTAL RATES AND THEIR IMPACT (AMOUNT IN RM)              
 
RENTAL RATES  ON RM                                                          10% 8% 6% LABELS 
TOTAL RENT (10 YEARS) 100,000 80000 60000 A = B + C 
RENTAL FOR CUSTOMER 38600 42243 33120 B 
RENTAL FOR THE  BANK 61400 37680 26880 C 
C//A 61.4% 47.1% 44.8 D 
                                                          
3
 We find that if monthly installments are converted into yearly payments for the ease of calculation, DBM would be 
cheaper by 0.54% per annum, almost the same as in our example. 
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receive more of cash in the installments. Thus, the bank would presumably be interested in a the 
lower rental rate in the agreement. The actual position would be settled by the market rental rate 
if the house is lent out; there would be little to negotiate. The DBM avoids all complications 
related to the rentals or of property valuations Meera and Razak are found struggling with in the 
case of MMP. 
         
APPENDIX 
   Table A1: Working of the conventional bank Model                                      Table A2: Working of the MMP Model 
Serial                                                                                                                             
No.    
Installments Interest Principal Balance 
0 -- --- --- -- 
1 5884 3200 2684 77316 
2 5884 3093 2791 74525 
3 5884 2981 2903 71622 
4 5884 2865 3019 68603 
5 5884 2744 3140 65463 
6 5884 2419 3265 62198 
7 5884 2488 3396 58802 
8 5884 3352 3512 55270 
9 5884 2211 3673 51597 
10 5884 2064 3820 47777 
11 5884 1911 3973 43804 
12 5884 1752 4132 39672 
13 5884 1587 4297 35375 
14 5884 1415 4469 30906 
15 5884 1236 4648 26258 
16 5884 1050 4834 21424 
17 5884 657 5057 16397 
18 5884 656 5228 11168 
19 5884 447 5437 5730 
20 5884 229 5655 89 
Total 117680 37757 79923  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper reinforces the argument of my earlier writings that the MMP model is no different in 
its consequences for the participants in Islamic home finance. The amortization processes these 
contracts use interest rates invariably contain a compounding “add on”, element, something 
much more severely condemned in the Qur‟an. How Islamic jurists could stamp such agreements 
as Shari‟ah compliant just beats me. More surprising is the attitude of neglect the bankers have 
Installment 
No. 
Rental Division (RM) Equity (RM) 
Customer Bank Customer Bank 
0   20000.0 80000.0 
1 800.0 3200.0 22684.0 77316.0 
2 907.4 3092.6 25475.4 74524.6 
3 1019.0 2981.0 28370.4 71629.6 
4 1134.8 2865.2 31389.2 68610.8 
5 1255.6 2744.4 34528.8 65471.2 
6 1381.1 2618.9 37793.9 62206.1 
7 1511.8 2488.2 41189.7 58810.3 
8 1647.6 2352.4 44721.3 55278.7 
9 1780.8 2211.2 48386.1 51613.9 
10 1935.4 2064.6 52205.5 47794.5 
11 2086.2 1911.8 56175.7 43624.3 
12 2247.0 1753.0 60306.7 39693.3 
13 2412.0 1588.0 64602.7 35397.3 
14 2584.1 1415.9 69070.8 30929.2 
15 2762.8 1237.2 73717.6 26282.4 
16 2948.7 1051.3 78565..3 21449.7 
17 3142.6 857.4 83591.9 16408.1 
18 3343.7 656.3 88819.6 11180.4 
19 3552.8 447.2 94256.4 5743.6 
20 3770.2 229.8 99910.6 89.4 
Total 42243 37757   
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so far shown to my at once Shari‟ah abiding and cheaper Diminishing Balance model the DBM. 
Once the underlying principle and procedures of this model are accepted, Islamic finance modes 
are likely to change in a radical way and gain a competitive edge over conventional finance in 
almost every sphere of financing practices. Allah knows the best. 
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